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The war on terror  triggered a debate over the treatment of members of Al Qaeda  
captured by US forces. The central point of the paper is that this debate is merely 
the most recent iteration of a dialectic constitutive of international humanitarian 
law.  Non-state combatants in warfare have always been the object of conflicting 
desires.  The history of international humanitarian law could be seen as the 
history of different attempts to engage (by excluding or including) with an other, 
outside the combatant/civilian distinction. The Paper focuses on two contrasting 
approaches to engaging with this other, namely, the inclusive approach of the 
1974-1977 Diplomatic Conferences in Geneva that lead to the promulgation of 











TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I.   Introduction ……………………………………………...................................6 
II. Distinction and the Unlawful Combatant …………………………….…. 9 
A. Conceptual Foundations of  Distinction………………………….….. 9 
B. Textual Sources of Distinction…………………………………….…10 
1. Who is A Civilian?................................................................12 
2. Who is A Combatant? ……………………………….….....12 
C.  Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatant………………………..................15 
III.  The 1974-1977 Geneva Diplomatic Conference Recognizing the Other…...18 
 A. Decolonization and its Effect on the Negotiations in Geneva. ………19 
  1. The shift in the Balance of Power………………...…….……..20 
  2. The Intellectual Movement Against Colonialism……….……,21 
3. National Liberation Movements…………….……………..….24 
 B.  Additional Protocol I and the Expansion of the Category of  
the Combatant…………………….......…………………….………..26 
  1. Controversy over Invitation of non-state actors……………….26 
  2. Article 1 ……………………………………………………….29 
  3. Article 44……………………………………………………....31 
IV.  The War on Terror and the Emergence of a New Other…………...………..37 
 A. The Terrorist as an Outlaw……………………………………………37 
 B. Confronting the New Other in the War on Terror……………………....40 
  1. Legal Status of Detainees…………………………….………..41 






There was a before-9/11 and an after-9/11….After 9/11 the gloves came off.1 
This was how Director of the CIA, Cofer Black, described the major change in policy 
brought about by the attacks of September 11, 2001. The attacks of 9/11 and the 
subsequent war on terror have triggered a very controversial debate. The main crux of 
the debate revolves around the application of humanitarian law to this conflict. One of 
the main elements of this debate on the applicability of humanitarian law to the war on 
terror is the unprecedented nature of the conflict and the novelty of the challenges it 
presents. In a speech given at the White House in 2006, President Bush stated, “We 
watched the twin towers collapse before our eyes, and it became instantly clear that 
we'd entered a new world and a dangerous new war.”2 In the same speech, while 
outlining his administration’s response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Mr. Bush stated, 
“We had to wage an unprecedented war against an enemy unlike any we had fought 
before.”3 Members of the Bush Administration further emphasized the unprecedented 
nature of this war and added that this unprecedented war required the use of 
unprecedented and somewhat questionable methods. Vice President Richard Cheney 
stated that, “it’s going to be vital to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve 
our objective” this would entail having to work through “some sort of dark side.”4 
Members of the Bush Administration were not the only ones to point out the novelty 
of the challenge presented by international terrorism.. In fact, shortly after the 9/11 
attacks, the United Nations’ Security Council passed Resolution 1377 that addressed 
the issue of international terrorism. The resolution used very strong language to 
describe the threat posed by the war on terror. It stated that, “acts of international 
 
1 John Barry, The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, (May 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/roots-torture-128007.  
2 President Bush’s Speech on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, (September 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
3 Id. 
4 MATHEW EVANGELISTA, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 59 (Polity Press 2008). 
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terrorism constitute a challenge to all states and to all of humanity.5” The resolution 
also stated that “acts of international terrorism are contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and that the financing, planning and 
preparation of as well as any other form of support for acts of international terrorism 
are similarly contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations.”6 Therefore the statements of Bush administration officials coupled with the 
Security Council Resolution condemning international terrorism demonstrate how the 
events of 9/11 created this image of a new threat arising. Although the most effective 
method of combating this new threat is still the cause of heated debate, the fact 
remains that the events of September 11th and the subsequent war on terror are 
represented as unprecedented events. In defending their approach to the war on terror, 
many members of the Bush administration claimed that international law was not 
equipped to deal with this new threat. Referring to the Geneva Convention, US 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated, “It was set up to deal with a war between 
sovereign states. It's got provisions for dealing with civil war. But in a case where you 
have nonstate actors out to kill civilians, then there's a serious question whether or not 
the Geneva Convention even applies.”7 Despite its prevalence, the claim that the war 
on terror presents a new challenge to international law is not entirely accurate. The 
war on terror presents international humanitarian law with a type of conflict that 
challenges the coherence of the distinction between international and internal conflicts 
and between civilians and combatants.  The terrorist, the so-called unlawful combatant 
is projected as the other in international humanitarian law.  An other, outside the 
distinction between civilian and combatants, was always present in international 
humanitarian law. At some point the other was the mercenary. In another point it was 
the colonial subject engaged in an armed conflict with the armies of the  colonizers.  
The aim of this paper is to explore the various methods with which international 
humanitarian law engages with its other. First, this paper will discuss the conceptual 
 
5 Security Council Resolution 1377, Nov. 4, 2001, available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm. 
6 Un Security Council Resolution, supra note 5.  
7 Katherine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives; Detainees Are Not P.O.W.’s, Cheney and 




grounding of the principle of distinction and the structure that the law establishes with 
regards to describing the lawful combatant. Then, it will explore the 1974-1977 
Diplomatic Conferences in Geneva as an example of an instance when the law 
attempted to directly engage with the other by inviting members of national liberation 
movements to attend the conferences. Finally, the paper will discuss the war on terror 
as an example of a period when the law did not directly engage with the other, but 
rather dealt with the other indirectly. The main argument of  this paper is that a 
dialectic with the other is constitutive of international humanitarian law. The thesis at 
the foundation of  modern international humanitarian law is that only the legitimate 
forces of sovereign states have the right to wage a legal war. This assertion 
immediately creates its antithesis that states that non-state actors can also participate 
in war. The synthesis would be the change in the main foundation of modern 
humanitarian law, that war is the exclusive realm of the state. The paper will also 
demonstrate how the law engages in a perpetual spiral relationship with its other, 
where in every instance it attempts to include the other, it creates a new other that it 
then attempts to engage with. The paper argues that so long as the law is founded on 
the notion that war is the exclusive domain of the state, then this dialectical process 
will continue to exist and the non-state combatants, in all their forms, will remain on 








Distinction and the Unlawful Combatant 
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Conceptual Foundations of Distinction: 
The modern formulation of the principle of distinction -in Articles 48 and 51 
of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions- comes to us from 
a line of codification endeavors expressing in different ways that in war combatants 
and non-combatants should be distinguished.8 The origins of the principle of 
distinction do not lie strictly within the realm of legal discourse. Instead, the concept 
is rooted in a very specific worldview that is the result of a political decision as to the 
nature of war. Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela traces the origins of distinction to the 
social contract theories of the state. Escorihuela focuses mainly on the difference 
between Rousseau and Hobbes on the nature of war. The precise moment to be 
highlighted here happens when Rousseau—agreeing with Hobbes that “war” is a state, 
rather than an event—interjects that for it to be a state it has to be by necessity a 
public phenomenon.9 Since war is a public act, the only legitimate actors in war are 
agents of the state. Violence between private individuals cannot be considered war 
because the act does not have a public element to it. These private individuals are not 
acting on behalf of a sovereign and, if there is no sovereign involved, then no state of 
war exists between these private individuals. War “demands from the groups which 
engage in it a unique intensity of societal organization and control.10 Rousseau adds to 
this by stating: 
War needs political society to exist on both psychological and conceptual 
grounds. Psychologically, the constitution of political society through the 
social contract permits the growth of feelings that will offset man’s natural 
fear, such as honor, prejudice, or vengeance. Those will make war as war 
possible. Conceptually, and more importantly, the constitution of political 
society gives rise to the possibility of a “state” of war, a set of permanent, or at 
least continuous, relations among things, based on the fact that property 
relations are given stability and durability by law. 11 
 
 
8 Alejandro Lorite, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: The Politics of Distinction, 19 MICH. 
ST. U. COLL. L. J. INT’L L. 299, 299-408 (2010). 
9 Id. 
10 JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, JUST WAR THEORY 23 (New York University Press 1992) (1992). 
11 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DU CONTRAT SOCIAL OU PRINCIPES DU DROIT POLITIQUEJean Jacques 
Rousseau, 357 (1762).  
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Therefore, one cannot have war without states. The fact that this state of war 
only exists between sovereigns makes the very purpose of war to be the defeat of the 
sovereign rather than its individual citizens. When one says, therefore, that the 
objective in war is the destruction of the enemy State, that means that the target is the 
abstraction constituted by the social contract; if one could break the social contract in 
one strike, the State would eo ipso disappear and the war would be over, yet no life 
would have been lost.12 Then, the participation of individuals in warfare is only by 
virtue of their status as agents of the state and this status is what gives them the right 
to legitimately engage in warfare. In other words, the privilege of killing is attached to 
the notion of the human being carrying out the function of soldiering, i.e. the idea that 
the human being is enveloped in that function in a way that makes him an instrument 
of the State.13  
Distinction is the product of a very specific definition of what war is. War 
consists of such deliberate, controlled, and purposeful acts of force combined and 
harmonized to attain what are ultimately political objectives.14 And as outlined above, 
the only entities allowed to wage war are states. The reason distinction is such an 
important aspect of international humanitarian law lies in the fact that it represents the 
foundation upon which the corpus of the law is built. Distinguishing between who has 
the right to legally wage war and who doesn’t or who can be legitimately targeted and 
who cannot is the main function of humanitarian law.  
Textual Sources of Distinction: 
The conceptual framework of the law outlined above has been reinforced in 
almost every single humanitarian law treaty. Therefore, this section will highlight 
exactly how these texts define the lawful combatant and how they reinforce the 
structural bias within the law. One of the first documents to distinguish between 
lawful and unlawful combatants was the Lieber Code of 1863. Francis Lieber, a 
German born law professor, was tasked with drafting a code of conduct for Union 




14 ELSHTAIN, supra note 10, at 25. 
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Orders No.100 and is more commonly referred to as the Lieber Code. The Lieber 
Code outlines prisoner of war status and details various types of unlawful actors on 
the battlefield.  The most relevant of these categories is that of the war rebel outlined 
in article 85 of the Code:  
War-rebels are persons within an occupied territory who rise in arms against 
the occupying or conquering army, or against the authorities established by the 
same. If captured, they may suffer death, whether they rise singly, in small or 
large bands, and whether called upon to do so by their own, but expelled, 
government or not. They are not prisoners of war; nor are they if discovered 
and secured before their conspiracy has matured to an actual rising or armed 
violence.15 
 
Another codification of the concept of distinction can be found in Article 48 of 
the Hague Convention on Land Warfare of 1904:  
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between 
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives.16 
 
Therefore, civilians and civilian structures are not to be targeted since they do 
not belong to the military forces of the enemy and do not constitute military 
objectives. The St Petersburg Declaration and the Hague Convention do not outline 
how this distinction could be achieved; What if the military forces of the enemy state 
have taken up positions inside civilian population centers? What about structures, 
such as bridges, that have a dual purpose? Before discussing how the law attempts to 
answer these questions it is important to outline what the legal definition of a civilian 
is. 
Who is A Civilian? 
 
15 Article 85 Lieber code ICRC website  
16 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Article 48, Oct. 18, 1907. ICRC. 
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Most international humanitarian law treaties define the civilian in negative 
terms. So in essence, the law defines individuals who can legally be targeted in times 
of war, namely combatants, and anything that falls outside said definition is 
considered a civilian and cannot be legitimately targeted. 
 
Article 4 outlines the characteristics of a combatant; the detailed definition of a 
combatant will be covered in the following section. However, what is very clear about 
the article is the negative approach to defining a civilian. The civilian is anybody who 
does not fall under the category of combatant.  Paragraph 3 makes it clear that the rule 
of distinction still applies to situations where combatants are present within a civilian 
population. Therefore, civilian populations remain protected even if combatants are 
present within them. 
 
Who is A Combatant?  
The first detailed definition of a combatant is that outlined in the 1899 Hague 
Convention: 
 Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also 
to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
  1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
  2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
  3. To carry arms openly; and 
 4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. 
 In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part 
of it, they are included under the denomination "army."17 
The definition of the lawful combatant outlined in the article makes it very clear that 
the drafters of the convention remained faithful to the notion that war occurs only 
between states.  Even when the Convention discussed militia or volunteer corps, they 
 
17 Convention (IV) Respecting the Rules and Customs of War on Land, supra note 16. 
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made sure to stress that they need to constitute part of the armed forces of a state.  It 
wasn’t until 1949, with the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, that this definition of 
a combatant was expanded. This expansion of the definition of a combatant appeared 
in the 3rd Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War and provided 
what seemed to be a slightly less state-centric definition of a combatant: 
Art 4. A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons 
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of 
the enemy:  
 (1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members 
of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces  
 (2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including 
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict 
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is 
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such 
organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions: 
  (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 
  (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
  (c) that of carrying arms openly; 
 (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government 
or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power….. 
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had 
time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms 
openly and respect the laws and customs of war.18 
 
Article 4 represents a much more comprehensive approach to defining the 
lawful combatant. However, despite the fact that it slightly expanded the category of 
the lawful combatant, Article 4 still maintains the state-centric approach of the Hague 
Convention. Despite the fact that various provisions in the article recognize militia 
 
18 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva. Article 4. Aug. 12, 1949. 
ICRC. 
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groups, volunteer corps and other resistance movements, the requirement that they be 
under the authority of a state still remains in place. The only section in the article 
where this state-centric approach is not adhered to is paragraph 6. Paragraph 6 
discusses the situation where civilians spontaneously take up arms against an 
occupying power. The temporal requirement in paragraph 6 is what limits the effect it 
has on expanding the category of lawful combatants. This is because paragraph 6 
stipulates that the uprising should take place as soon as the occupying forces arrive 
and the forces engaged in said uprising had not time to organize themselves into an 
effective resistance force.  
The Convention also recognizes that in certain instances, it can be difficult to 
determine whether an individual detained in times of war qualifies as a combatant or 
not. Article 5 outlines how states should deal with determining the status of 
individuals captured in times of war: 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent 
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the 
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of 
the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal.19 
It is important to note that failure to fit the definition of a combatant does not 
leave a detainee in an armed conflict without any rights. The Geneva Conventions 
outline a set of rights that must be afforded to detainees who are not recognized as 
lawful combatants. According to Article 45 (3) of Protocol I additional to the Geneva 
Conventions, prisoners who do not qualify as lawful combatants are protected under 
Article 75 of the Protocol: 
1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article 1of this 
Protocol, persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do 
not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under 
this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as 
a minimum, the protection provided by this Article without any adverse 
distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on 
 
19 Convention III, supra note 19. 
 10 
any other similar criteria. Each Party shall respect the person, honour, 




The terms unlawful/unprivileged combatant do not appear in any of the 
international humanitarian law treaties. Despite this, these terms have been used 
frequently throughout the modern history of armed conflict. Terms such as ‘illegal 
combatants’, ‘unprivileged combatants’, and ‘unlawful combatants’ have been around 
for as long as there have been laws governing the conduct of hostilities.21 The exact 
definition of what an unlawful combatant is has differed throughout history. In 1863, 
Francis Lieber outlined various categories of individuals who were not considered 
lawful actors on the battlefield. They remained subject to prosecution and, possibly, 
death sentences.22 In essence, these categories of individuals, by virtue of their 
unlawful status, forfeit the protections afforded to combatants. The punishment of 
captured guerrilla forces, including in some instances by death, was evidenced 
subsequently in the United States-Mexican War, the American Civil War, the Franco-
Prussian War, the Philippine Insurrection, and the South African War.23 One of the 
most well known cases of unlawful combatancy was the Ex Parte Quirin case of 1942 
before the US Supreme Court.  The case involved a group of German soldiers who 
had landed on US soil to engage in acts of sabotage. The soldiers discarded their 
uniforms after landing on US soil. The soldiers were subsequently captured and put on 
trial and charged with unlawful combatancy. The court stated that unlawful 
combatants were “subject to capture and detention,... [and] trial and punishment by 
military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.”24 The period of 
the Second World War saw an increase in cases related to unlawful combatants. 
 
20 Protocol I, supra note 17.  
21 Rene Vark, The Status and Protection of Unlawful Combatants, available at 
http://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2005_1_191.pdf 
22 Kenneth Watkins, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, And the 
Struggle Over Legitimacy 1-77. (Occasional Paper Series, Number 2, 2005) 
23 id. 
24 Ex Parte Quirin et al 317 U.S. 1 (1942) 
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Unlawful combatants in the Second World War were mostly members of guerilla and 
resistance movements. In the 1948 Hostages Case, the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that 
a person “may act lawfully for his country and at the same time be a war criminal to 
the enemy, so guerrillas may render great service to their country and, in the event of 
success, become heroes even, still they remain war criminals in the eyes of the enemy 
and may be treated as such.”25  The court in some sense acknowledges the legal right 
of these resistance movements to resist occupation, however, it also acknowledges the 
rights of the enemy to treat guerilla fighters as criminals and detain and try them.  
 
Throughout the modern history of warfare, the issue of unlawful/unprivileged 
combatants seems to have always been present. However, it is clear that various states 
have dealt with the matter individually and have created somewhat of an informal 
legal doctrine on the issue of unlawful combatancy  
In conclusion, the principle of distinction represents a very specific definition of 
warfare that has been extrapolated from a specific political worldview. This 
conceptual grounding is carried over into the text of the law and is reinforced at every 
opportunity. All those participants in warfare who do not fit into this conceptual 
framework are cast out. They are the unlawful, the illegitimate, and the other of the 
law. This section sought to outline the structure that the law had put in place to 
distance itself from its other. The coming sections will explore two examples of the 







25Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 


















The 1974-77 Diplomatic Conferences in Geneva: Recognition of the 
Other 
 
The Diplomatic Conferences in Geneva, which began in 1974 and ended with 
the promulgations of Additional Protocols I and II in 1977, represent an important 
turning point in humanitarian law. Before the Diplomatic Conferences in Geneva, 
colonial resistance and wars of national liberation were regarded as an internal affair 
where domestic, rather than humanitarian, law applied. Throughout the 19th century 
and much of the 20th, the actions of colonial powers in wars of national liberation 
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reinforced the notion that colonial resistance movements fell outside the scope of 
international law.  During the war of the Rif, the President of the Spanish Red Cross 
described the Rifans as “rebels against their government, outside the law of their 
country and not belligerents.”26 Various other European powers shared the view of the 
President of the Spanish Red Cross. On July 3, 1924, Mr. Ponsonby of the British 
Parliament reported that His Majesty King George V recognized the Riffians not as 
belligerents but as rebels, therefore refusing to acknowledge the Rif as a nation or to 
intervene in the bloodshed of the Rif War.27 Another Example of the exclusion of 
national liberation movements from the corpus of international humanitarian law is 
the Algerian war of independence. During war, France did not recognize Algerian 
fighters as fellow belligerents. Until 1956, captured members of the FLN were 
routinely prosecuted under a special powers act, which provided for detention without 
trial and special court jurisdiction for crimes against the security of the State.28 
Therefore, prior to the conferences in Geneva, national liberation movements were not 
recognized by colonial powers as belligerents and thus purposefully excluded from 
international law. The lack of recognition of belligerency meant that these conflicts 
were regarded as internal conflicts, giving colonial powers a very large amount of 
discretion when it came to suppressing national liberation movements.  
The 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conferences in Geneva did not engage with the 
non-state combatant as existing outside the bounds of the law. By the beginning of the 
1970s, the evolution of law and practice had thus reached such a stage as to make it 
extremely difficult to continue to deny the international legal character of wars of 
national liberation.29 As a result, for the first time in the history of humanitarian treaty 
negotiations, representatives of various national liberation movements were invited to 
participate in the proceedings in Geneva. Such organisations included, inter alia, the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the People’s Movement for the 
 
26 Anna Chotzen, Beyond Bounds: Morocco’s Rif War and the Limits of International Law, 5 HUMNTY 
33, 33-54 (2014).  
27 Id, 
28 Heather Wilson, Humanitarian Protection in Wars of National Liberation, 8 ARMS CNTRL 36, 38-
48 (2007).  
29 ABI SAAB, Wars of National Liberation 357-445 (Collected  Courses Of The Hague Academy of 
International Law, Volume IV, 1979). 
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Liberation of Angola. The inclusion of national liberation movements in the 
Diplomatic Conferences of 1974-1977 was part of a larger historical change that was 
taking place in the world. 
 
Decolonization and its Effect on the Negotiations in Geneva: 
The inclusion of national liberation movements in the Diplomatic Conferences 
of 1974-1977 was part of a larger historical change that was taking place in the world. 
Decolonization was by far one of the most significant historical phenomena of the 20th 
century. It would be impossible to fully capture the essence of this historical 
phenomenon in this paper. However, my aim in this section is to shed light on the 
main historical changes that initiated the process of decolonization and the effects this 
process had on the international order. For it was this process that eventually led to the 
convening of the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference in Geneva and the conclusion of 
the Additional Protocols.  
Change in the Balance of Power:  
The Second World War saw the rise to prominence of two major powers, 
namely the Soviet Union and the United States. Towards the end of the war, the 
disparity in power between Europe and the United states became unmistakable. By 
1944, when plans were being made for D-day, the day of the naval invasion of 
German-held Europe, Great Britain seemed to have been reduced to a military staging 
area, no longer the seat of a colonial empire.30  
During the war, the United States began articulating its position towards the 
colonial possessions of European states. In 1942, the State Department drafted a 
document calling for the independence of colonies. In final form, as the Declaration of 
National Independence, the statement extended the Atlantic Charter principles to all 
nations.31 The Atlantic Charter was a joint British American Declaration that outlined 
various principles that were common between both states; these principles were later 
 
30 BETTS, supra note 28 at 24. 
31 JAMES P. HUBBARD, THE UNITED STATES AND THE END OF BRITISH COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA (Mcfarland 
and Company Inc. 2010) (2010). 
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incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations. The principle that created 
controversy between the American and British government was the third principle 
which stated that, “they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self 
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them”.32 The State 
Department declaration did not only emphasize that this principle applies to all 
nations and not just those occupied by Nazi Germany. It called upon colonial powers 
to prepare dependent peoples for independence, through education and progressive 
steps toward self-government.33 Consequently, the United States envisioned a system 
of tutelage, where European powers would educate their colonial subjects on how to 
be independent states and then grant them said independence when they are deemed 
ready. In 1944, the United States promoted the idea of creating a trusteeship council 
that would monitor this process. The council was empowered to conduct 
investigations of trust areas, to receive petitions for their inhabitants, and to receive 
reports from the administering authorities.34 In essence, the Roosevelt administration 
created a system similar to the League of Nations mandate system where colonial 
rulers would teach the inhabitants of their colonies how to become independent states. 
The goal here seemed to be to ensure that these independent states would behave like 
their “civilized” European counterparts.  
The cold war complicated the approach of the United States towards 
decolonization. The Truman administration was afraid that rapid decolonization might 
increase the influence of the Soviet Union. That the basic ideology of colonial 
liberation was a compound of nationalism and Marxism, with the second considered 
the more volatile element, led Americans to see the influence of the Soviet Union 
nearly everywhere.35 As a result, the United States developed a more conservative, 
approach to decolonization. As the State Department’s perceptions of the postwar 
world changed, they became more favorable towards colonial regimes prepared to 
offer sufficient satisfaction to moderate nationalists to forestall the danger of 
 
32 The Atlantic Charter, Aug 14, 1941, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp.  
33 HUBBARD, supra note 33. 
34 HUBBARD, supra note 33.  
35 Betts, supra note 28  at 34.  
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communist penetration.36 This contradictory policy toward decolonization endured up 
until the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conferences held in Geneva.  
Intellectual Movement Against Colonialism: 
The move towards decolonization was not simply the result of Europe’s 
weakness and the change in the global balance of power in favor of the United States 
and the Soviet Union. However, the colonial encounter itself played a major role in 
the rise of the anti-colonial movement that would later be termed Third Worldism. 
Third Worldism then, was the child of two encounters: the territorial, as Europe 
foisted itself upon the Third World and the Third World encroached upon Europe; and 
the ideological, as preexisting modes of thought and perspectives, together with new 
outlooks born of these contacts, confronted each other.37 Colonialism itself played a 
role in the creation of the very movement that would call for its end.38 This was due to 
the various internal contradictions that existed within the colonial structure.  
Colonialism was a messy business: on its tail came economic dislocation and 
upheaval, rural pauperization, the privatization of land, forced resettlement, and 
anarchic urbanization.39 Basically, colonialism dismantled and sought to replace the 
main power structures of the colonies. Colonialism thus encouraged the emergence of 
an educated local elite, a middle class whose links to traditional economic, political, 
even cultural structures were severed.40 These local elites would facilitate colonial 
rule by participating in the bureaucratic process of colonial administration. 
Paradoxically, however, and at the same time, the colonial order blocked this ascent, 
erecting an insurmountable color or racial barrier.41 Therefore, this class of elites was 
not only isolated from the majority of the local population, but it was also not fully 
welcome amongst the European elite. The European elite would not acknowledge the 
colonial elite as equals. What European rule offered with one hand –dangling 
titillating prospects of membership in a modern social and cultural universe- it 
 
36 John D. Hargeaves, Decolonization in Africa 92 (Longman 1988) (1988).  
37 ROBERT MALLEY, THE CALL FROM ALGERIA: THIRD WORLDISM, REVOLUTION, AND THE TURN TO ISLAM 18 
(University of California Press 1996) (1996). 
38 Id. 
39 Malley, supra note 39 at 19. 
40 MALLEY, supra note 39 at 20. 
41 MALLEY, supra note 39 at 20. 
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unceremoniously withdrew with the other.42 It is this internal contradiction that turned 
members of these elites against colonialism. For it became apparent that the creation 
of this elite was merely another tool through which colonial powers could exert their 
dominance over their colonial possessions. The fact remained that despite their status 
as elites in the colonies, they were still considered as inferior by European states.  
Frequently educated in the languages that provided access to a wide 
readership, knowledgeable of the European philosophical tradition of protest, and 
often writing and organizing their initial efforts in the capitals or major cities of the 
countries whose colonial policies they roundly denounced, these individuals adapted 
and reworked European thought to express their own concerns and intentions.43 This 
class of intellectuals did not direct their work towards their compatriots as much as 
they did towards their oppressors. Their goal was to provide a different perspective on 
colonialism, a perspective that demonstrated the oppressive nature of colonialism.  
One of the most significant works of this period was Frantz Fanon’s Wretched 
of the Earth, which was widely read at the time and still stands out as one of the most 
influential works on the topic of decolonization. Fanon’s main claim was that 
colonialism was primarily an act of violence and that the only way to effectively resist 
colonization was through violent means. As a result, the book created a large degree 
of controversy in Western circles. Many European intellectuals hailed the book as a 
true representation of the sentiments of the third world. In his preface to Fanon’s book, 
Jean Paul Sartre states: 
Europeans, you must open this book and enter into it. After a few steps in the 
darkness you will see strangers gathered around a fire; come close, and listen, 
for they are talking of the destiny they will mete out to your trading centers 
and to the hired soldiers who defend them. They will see you, perhaps, but 
they will go on talking among themselves, without even lowering their voices. 
This indifference strikes home: their fathers, shadowy creatures, your 
creatures, were but dead souls; it was you who allowed them glimpses of light, 
to you only did they dare speak, and you did not bother to reply to such 
zombies. Their sons ignore you; a fire warms them and sheds light around 
them, and you have not lit it. Now, at a respectful distance, it is you who will 
 
42 MALLEY, supra note 39 at 20.  
43 BETTS, supra note 28 at  37. 
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feel furtive, nightbound, and perished with cold. Turn and turn about; in these 
shadows from whence a new dawn will break, it is you who are the zombies.44 
 
Sartre’s foreword does not only illustrate the power of Fanon’s work, but it 
also says something about the entire intellectual movement against colonialism. It 
demonstrates how this movement had allies amongst the European intelligentsia. 
Sartre is but one example of the large number of European intellectuals who spoke out 
against colonialism. In fact the term Third World first appeared in 1952 in an article 
written by a French economist named Alfred Sauvy in the French newspaper 
L’Observateur. In this article, Sauvy coined the term third world stemming from the 
medieval notion of the third estate, a term that described the common man as 
distinguished from nobility and clergy.45 By suggesting a parallel between the 
emergence of the nations of the South and the awakening of the tiers état that had led 
to the French Revolution of 1789, Sauvy gave words to the feelings of humiliation and 
appetite for international recognition that animated colonies and dependencies.46 
Therefore, the encounter between the intellectuals of the colonies and their European 
counterparts might have yielded some positive results in terms of establishing a global 
movement against colonialism. However, it also constricted this movement. The 
European education that the colonial elites received, which facilitated the encounter 
with their European counterparts, also constricted their movement against colonialism 
within a specific European worldview.  
As a result of the creation of an international movement against colonialism, 
decolonization became a global phenomenon endorsed by almost every international 
or regional organization in the globe. In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted resolution 1514 which stated:  
1.  The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of 
 
44 FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH VII (trans. Richard Philcox Grove Press 2004) 
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the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and 
co-operation.47 
 
Resolution 1514 did not simply condemn colonization as constituting a 
violation of the United Nations charter, but it also demanded that any remaining 




National Liberation Movements: 
While the intellectual movement against colonialism was gaining ground in 
both the first and third world, another form of colonial resistance was also forming, 
namely wars of national liberation. The main players in these wars were armed groups 
formed to violently resist colonial occupation.  
The colonial era was characterized by a strict adherence to the classical definition of 
warfare as being between states and of the lawful combatant being the agent of these 
warring states. Wars fought between colonial powers and the resistance movements in 
the various colonies fell within the domain of internal wars. However, the rise to 
prominence of national liberation movements challenged this notion of warfare. A 
notion that had been enshrined in the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: 
What the drafters in 1949 could not have foreseen, was the truly enormous 
tidal wave of guerilla activities which in the thirty years following 1945 
affected countries which had not yet achieved independence. It was not clear at 
that time that ultimately guerilla warfare would be the method par excellence 
for liberation movements and that the tide of self-determination would propel 
these movements forwards, without giving thought to the conditions agreed 
upon in the Hague in another time and for other circumstances48 
 
47 UN General Assembly Resolution 1415, Dec. 5, 1959, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/142/38/IMG/NR014238.pdf?OpenElement 
48 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF JUNE 8 1977 384 (Yves Sandoz ed. Chritophe 
Swinarski ed. Bruno Zimmermann ed., Martinues Nijhoff Publishers 1987) (1987). 
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These newly independent states were eager to exercise their sovereign rights, 
as subjects of the law, to shape the content of the law itself. In essence, these states 
wished to change the law into a more universal law, to dilute the Eurocentric biases 
that existed within it and to make it more representative. These nations wanted to 
make the law also reflect their needs and protect their positions as newly established 
states. 
The creation of a special status for national liberation movements in 
humanitarian law was one of the main objectives of many recently decolonized states 
participating in the negotiations on the Additional Protocols. The state agent can no 
longer be recognized as the only legitimate actor on the battlefield. The efforts of the 
Third World nations and the various national liberation movements led to the 
inclusion of somewhat expansive provisions into the text of the Additional Protocols.  
This departure from the traditional approach to warfare is most apparent in two 
aspects of the Additional Protocols. The first challenge to the traditional view of 
warfare came in the form of the relaxation in Additional Protocol I of the 
requirements for armed combatants in. The other very controversial aspect of 
Additional Protocol I was the expansion of the scope of application. The coming 
sections will be devoted to exploring the debate that occurred during the drafting of 
these articles and the various obstacles that the final wording of these articles have 
created. 
Controversy over Invitation of Non-state Actors: 
It became evident from the very first session of the Diplomatic Conference 
that the issue of national liberation movements would take center stage in the 
negotiation process. Four otherwise simple organizational matters caused a large 
degree of controversy in the first proceedings of the conference. First, there was the 
problem of the division of conference offices. The Swiss government’s proposal for 
dividing the officers was rejected by many of the delegations present at the 
conference. As a result, a long process of negotiation ensued in order to devise a more 
acceptable method for the allocation of offices. Final agreement was not achieved 
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until March 1, more than one week after convocation of the session.49 The second 
controversial issue, an issue that will be covered in detail in this section, was the 
invitation of national liberation movements to participate in the conference. The third 
organizational challenge came in the form of extending an invitation to the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG). The 
fourth controversial organizational issue to arise was related to the issue of 
credentials. Various states made reservations or statements of protest with regard to 
the credentials of various delegations participating at the conference. Reservations 
were stated with respect to the Republic of Vietnam (a state which some delegations 
said should be represented in whole or in part by the PRG), South Africa (due to its 
policy of apartheid), Portugal (on the grounds that it had no right to speak for its 
overseas territories), the Khmer Republic (which several states asserted should have 
been represented by the Sihanouk regime), and Israel (on the ground that it was an 
aggressor).50 Therefore, the controversy in the diplomatic conferences started before 
the conference began discussing substantive issues. The fact that delegations attending 
the conference spent so much time in negotiations to agree on issues that were purely 
organizational in nature is telling of the nature of the conferences themselves. This 
section will be dedicated to exploring one of these controversies in detail, namely the 
invitation of national liberation movements to participate in the proceedings of the 
diplomatic conferences in Geneva. An examination of the debate on this topic is 
crucial because it represents one of the instances in the conference of an engagement 
with the other, the non-state actor.  
Calls to include national liberation movements in the proceedings of the 
diplomatic conference were made before the conference was inaugurated. The first 
official demand for the inclusion of national liberation movements in the proceedings 
in Geneva came in General Assembly Resolution 3102, which urged that the national 
liberation movements recognized by the various regional intergovernmental 
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organizations concerned be invited to participate in the Diplomatic Conference as 
observers in accordance with the practice of the United Nations.51  
Once the conference began, it was the representatives of third world states and 
members of the socialist bloc of states that demanded that invitations to attend the 
diplomatic conferences be extended to members of national liberation movements. 
The statements of the Ukrainian representative at the third plenary session capture the 
main justification behind the desire to include national liberation movements. 
According to the Ukrainian representative, “the struggle for independence and for 
liberation from the colonial yoke was an irreversible phenomenon of modern times” 
and thus “the conference should profit from the experience of people fighting for their 
national liberation.”52 This support for national liberation movements must be seen in 
light of the rise of Third Worldism and specifically Third World Approaches to 
International Law; these movements sought to challenge the status quo of the 
international order and more specifically international law.  
The opposition to this proposal came primarily from the United States and 
Western Europe. The main reason behind the objection was the unusual nature of the 
proposal itself. The view was also expressed that since none of the organizations had 
gained international recognition as the legitimate representatives of an established 
state, they had no basis for participating in a conference called for the expressed 
purpose of formulating new concepts of international law.53 The representative of the 
Federal Republic of Germany elaborated on this point by stating that “international 
law was created only by states, which alone were in a position to apply it” and that 
“[T]he Conference should of course take advantage of the experience of other 
organizations,  but conclusions could be drawn only by States which would be 
responsible for implementing them.”54 In essence, the states that had reservations over 
the inclusion of national liberation movements were concerned about the effect this 
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move would have in terms of challenging the position of states as the sole subject of 
international Law. 
After intense negotiations, the delegations present at the conference in Geneva 
passed a resolution that allowed for the inclusion of national liberation movements in 
the proceedings of the conference. The resolution stated that it 
Decides to invite the national liberation movements, which are recognized by 
regional intergovernmental organizations concerned, to participate fully in the 
deliberations of the conference and its main committees 
Decides further that, notwithstanding anything contained in the rules of 
procedure, the statements made or the proposals and amendments submitted by 
delegations of such national liberation movements shall be circulated by the 
Conference Secretariat as Conference documents to all the participants in the 
Conference, it being understood that only delegations representing States will 
be entitled to vote. 55 
This proposed article attempted to close the gap between the states demanding 
the representation of national liberation movements at the conference and those who 
were reluctant to do so because said representation would constitute a departure from 
custom. Although this moment is celebrated as marking a departure from convention, 
a closer reading of the text of the resolution paints a different picture. The resolution 
did allow national liberation movements to take an active part in the negotiation 
process in the Diplomatic Conferences. This should not be viewed as a shift in the 
law; rather, it was a momentary decision that took into consideration and was 
influenced by the various historic processes that were outlined above. This was made 
clear by the statements of the representative of the United States. In agreeing to this 
procedure, the Chairman of the United States delegation emphasized that participation 
by these groups in this particular diplomatic session should not be regarded as a 
precedent for future international conferences.56 In essence, the inclusion of national 
liberation movements in the Diplomatic Conference was not meant to reflect the 
development of a new trend in the drafting of international agreements.  
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Article 1: 
The drafting process of Article 1 was by far one of the most controversial 
aspects of the Diplomatic Conferences in Geneva. The purpose of Article 1 was to 
outline the material scope application of Additional Protocol I. As the Drafting 
Committee opened its deliberations, three proposals were immediately submitted with 
respect to wars of "national liberation" and "self-determination" -a Soviet bloc 
proposal, a proposal by Algeria and fourteen other states (including Australia and 
Norway), and a proposal by Romania.57  The Algerian proposal was the proposal that 
eventually passed and became the text of Article 1. The most important and 
controversial part of Article 1 was paragraph 4:   
4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts 
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, 
as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.58 
The majority of third world states attending the Diplomatic Conference 
celebrated the adoption of the above-mentioned article. It represented a crowning of 
the effort to include a category of non-state actors into the realm of humanitarian law. 
The Syrian representative stated, “that the vote on Article 1 was a historic occasion of 
great legal, humanitarian and political significance.”59 Although Article 1 achieved 
what its drafters intended, it still fell short of fully engaging with humanitarian law’s 
other.  
The first limiting factor of Article 1 is that in 1977, wars of national liberation 
represented an anachronism. The provisions on wars of national liberation were very 
much a product of the decolonization era that came to an end not long after the 
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adoption of the Additional Protocols.60 By the time the Additional Protocols were 
adopted in 1977, only a handful of states remained under colonial rule. In essence, the 
Article 1 (4) dealt with a mode of conflict that was in its final stages.  
 The inclusion of national liberation movements into the scope of Protocol I 
excluded other forms of non-state militant groups. Third world nations at the Geneva 
conferences sought only the recognition of wars of national liberation in Additional 
Protocol I. The question of why said states did not endeavor to include other forms of 
conflict can only be explained by taking into account the larger historical context. 
Most of the representatives of third world states attending the conference in Geneva 
had just recently gained their independence. This was the golden age of the legal 
concept of Uti Posedeites Juris. Most governments in the third world were in the 
process of consolidating their power. As a result, most of the governments of these 
states were concerned with maintaining their hold on power and preserving the 
political unit that they govern. The Nigerian representative touched upon this in his 
statement before the Drafting Committee. He understood the right to self-
determination not, as encouraging secessional and divisive subversion in multi-ethnic 
nations, but as applying to a struggle against colonial and alien domination, foreign 
occupation and racist regimes.61 However, these limitations should not be seen as 
representing a failure to engage with the other. Instead, they represent the very 
dynamic this paper seeks to uncover.  
 
Article 44: 
Article 44 is by far the most crucial provision of Additional Protocol I. After a 
series of lengthy negotiations, the final draft of Article 44 was adopted at the fortieth 
plenary meeting. It states that: 
1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an 
adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war. 
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2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a 
combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an 
adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war, except as provided in 
paragraphs 3 and 4.  
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects 
of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation 
preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in 
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant 
cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided 
that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: 
  (a) during each military engagement, and 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is 
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack 
in which he is to participate.62 
 
Paragraph 3 initially reaffirms the notion that combatants should always 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population; it also envisages situations where 
such a distinction cannot be made. The distinction outlined above, or rather the 
recognition of instances when the traditional forms of distinction should be changed, 
serves to include the guerilla fighter into the fold of lawful combatants. The article 
also takes into account the very practical reasons behind the inability of guerilla 
fighters to distinguish themselves from the civilian population in the same way 
members of the regular armed forces of a state are required to.  
Article 44 sparked yet another controversy among the delegations attending 
the Diplomatic Conferences. The final version of the article represented a compromise 
that was reached after a lengthy process of negotiation. In theory, the participants in 
the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-1977 all agreed on the need to change the 
traditional definition of the lawful combatant in order to recognize members of 
national liberation movements as legitimate participants on the battlefield. However, 
reaching consensus on the practicalities of this expansion of the definition of the 
lawful combatant proved somewhat elusive.  
 
62 Supra note 64. 
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The extent to which the negotiations on the drafting of Article 44 were 
difficult can be seen clearly in the final vote on the article; 73 members voted in 
favour of Article 44, while Israel voted against and 21 participants abstained63. 
Although Israel was the only country to vote against Article 44, the fact that so many 
countries abstained on the vote tells us something about the level of discord amongst 
the participants in the Geneva conference. Most of the delegations that voted on the 
draft of Article 44 addressed the drafting committee to explain their vote.  Despite the 
fact that most of the recently decolonized states and the national liberation movements 
represented in the conference regarded this article as a massive step forward, many of 
them remained somewhat disappointed with the final outcome. The representative for 
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation stated that his delegation was not fully 
satisfied with the compromise text achieved as a result of arduous negotiations, but it 
constituted a basis for the further development and improvement of humanitarian 
law.64 The representative of Egypt for example stated that some wording of the article 
left something to be desired.65 The representative of Sudan described the article as 
“falling short”66 of his country’s expectations.  
On the other hand, many states expressed concern with regards to the effect 
that Article 44 might have with respect to the obligations of parties to a conflict to 
protect the civilian population. In explaining why his delegation abstained, the 
representative of Spain stated that “the text does not guarantee the safety of the 
civilian population, which is the essential aim of the instruments under 
consideration.”67 The representative of Ireland went even further by stating that the 
“protection of the civilian population demanded by humanitarian principles is eroded 
by Article 42 to an unacceptable extent.”68  Denmark, in explaining why it had 
abstained, also stated that Article 44 “had appeared unduly to blur the distinction 
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between civilians and combatants which was of fundamental importance in building 
the structure of the two protocols.”69  
  Another limiting factor of Article 44 however does not lie in the text of the 
article itself, but rather in the limitations set forth in previous articles. As outlined 
above, the Additional Protocols only apply to national liberation movements. As a 
result, the provisions of Article 44 only apply to this specific context as well. Many 
delegations at the conference sought to make this point very clear. The Canadian 
representative stated that “the situations described in the second sentence of paragraph 
3 could exist only in occupied territory or in armed conflicts as described in Article 1, 
paragraph 4, of Protocol I.”70  
The Diplomatic Conferences of 1974-1977 represent a unique moment in 
international legal history. Its uniqueness originates from the fact that it represents an 
attempt to directly engage with the other. This shift from excluding the other to 
attempting to include and engage with the other can only be explained by discussing 
the context in which such a shift occurred. The various political and economic 
changes that took place after the end of World War II had severely weakened 
European empires. Furthermore, as a result of the internal contradictions that existed 
within the colonial system itself, the elites in the colonies began interacting with their 
European counterparts and began exposing the ugly side of colonialism. Segments of 
the European elite were receptive to this critique of colonialism because they 
themselves had started questioning the merits of the colonial system. The carnage of 
World War I had left many deeply skeptical about Western values.71 This period also 
saw the rise of various national liberation movements who took up arms against their 
colonial oppressors and began articulating demands for self-determination. The 
encounter between colonial elites and their European counterparts coupled with the 
proliferation of national liberation movements across the colonies gave rise to a strong 
international movement that called for an end to colonialism. It was against this 
backdrop that the Diplomatic Conferences in Geneva took place. From the first 
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session of the conference, it became clear that the status of national liberation 
movements would take center stage at the negotiations. However, this process reduced 
the other into the narrow category of national liberation movements. It would be 
erroneous to claim that the issue here was the negotiations themselves. The issue here 
is more structural. The moment the third world intellectual encountered the European 
intellectual and engaged with him, the colonial subject ceased to become the other. 
The colonial elite articulated their demands using the various philosophical doctrines 
that had originated from Europe. National liberation movements also became part of 
this encounter. Even as early as the war of the Rif, national liberation movements 
were articulating their demands based on the European model of the nation state.  The 
same analysis applies to the 1974-1977 diplomatic conferences.  The moment the 
delegations of national liberation mouvements were recorgnized in the conference 
they ceased to be the other.  This moment of recognition rearrange the internal 
structure of international humanitarian law and project another category of 
participants in conflicts as a new other. The cycle of the dialectic between self and 
other continued and as the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva was engaging with one 
category of the other, another was emerging.  
 
The War on Terror and the Emergence of a New Other 
 
While the Diplomatic Conferences in Geneva were taking place, a new 
distinction was emerging between national liberation movements and international 
terrorist groups. The international community recognized the legitimacy of national 
liberation movements and sought to distinguish them from the new category of the 
other. A 1972 General Assembly resolution tackling the issue of international 
terrorism reaffirms:  
The inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples 
under colonial and racist régimes and other forms of alien domination and 
upholds the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national 
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liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United Nations.72 
This distinction between national liberation movements and international terrorists 
was reaffirmed in various resolutions of the General Assembly adopted in 1977, 1979, 
1981 and 1983. 73 In essence, international terrorist groups replaced national liberation 
movements as the new other of international humanitarian law.  
The Terrorist as Outlaw: 
Over the decades, international terrorism has been depicted as the civilized world’s 
most dangerous enemy. In her paper titled On Terrorism: Reflections on violence and 
the Outlaw, Iliana M. Porras outlines how the literature on the topic of terrorism 
depicts the terrorist as being the opposite of what western democracies stand for. In 
her analysis of a statement made by Gideon Rafael at the third session of the 
Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism, Porras outlines the elements that are 
commonly used to describe terrorism: 
First comes the claim that a terrorist is the “antithesis of democracy”; both 
cannot therefore concurrently exist. By necessity one threatens or extinguishes 
the other. Since democracy is good, terrorism must be evil. Terrorism, we are 
told, “subjugates and perverts”; these are images of domination and perversion. 
Terrorists are “reckless” and resort to “unbridled violence.” They are out of 
control. They “plot the extermination of another people”; they are heartless, 
cruel, and extreme and seek the total destruction of their “other,” that is, “us.” 
They terrorize their own kinsmen”; they do not even recognize family ties, the 
most basic human allegiance. “A fiendish fringe which worships violence and 
despises humanity”; they are devils, or devil worshipers, and outside the 
human family. “They are the outlet for uncontrolled savage passions”; they are 
everything that civilization was created to suppress. They threaten us with 
falling back in our primitive and savage past.74 
The description above depicts the terrorist as totally alien. The terrorist is 
totally alien to any notion of civilization. The terrorist does not value human life and 
is hell bent on destruction. The terrorist is foreign to his own people. Even other 
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movements that engage in violence, such as national liberation movements, have 
nothing in common with terrorists: 
The idea that one person’s “terrorist” is another’s “freedom fighter” cannot be 
sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don’t blow up buses containing 
non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t set out to 
capture and slaughter schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters 
don’t assassinate innocent businessmen or hijack and hold hostage innocent 
men, women and children; terrorist murderers do.75 
The language of both statements describing terrorists is overly emphatic and 
fraught with emotion. This serves to emphasize the otherness of the terrorist. It also 
serves to close debate on the whole issue. It becomes impossible to talk about 
terrorism in any manner that does not emphasize the otherness of the terrorist. 
Terrorists “slaughter schoolchildren” and “assassinate innocent businessmen”, how can 
one explain their madness? There is no room to question this depiction of the terrorist. 
Instead of finding fault with those who truly care about the innocents’ dying, we 
should be out there doing something about terrorism. 76 There is only one choice that 
terrorist literature leaves us with, to fight terrorism. To unequivocally stand against it, 
anything else would be construed as supporting terrorism. To not condemn terrorism 
is to condone it, and to condone terrorism is to be morally as bad as a 
terrorist.77Terrorism is depicted as being something foreign to Western societies: 
The terrorist is always the “enemy.” The trick is to locate him in the category 
of the most terrifying traditional enemy -that one which the public is 
accustomed to think of as the barbarous and primitive outsider. The enemy of 
legend and history books. The bloodthirsty invader of our collective 
imagination and individual nightmares. The moslem moorish turkish invader 
of Europe dark mysterious turban wearing merciless scimitar wielding head 
cutting harem keeping mosque going minaret prayer chanting magician 
Christian hating Jerusalem prophanator holy war maker of he past has made a 
remarkable comeback.78 
The international terrorist enemy is typically represented as the Islamic 
fundamentalist. An enemy that has threatened Europe before, threatened to destroy its 
civilization. As evidenced by the statement above, every aspect of this enemy is 
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absolutely foreign and barbaric in nature. This depiction of the international terrorist 
as the dark skinned and barbaric Muslim fundamentalist is constantly emphasized in 
mainstream Western discourse. In 1992, the State Department used a report on the 
topic of global terrorism; there were eight photographs in the report. Of the eight 
photographs, six depict persons or incidents related to Islamic fundamentalism.79 
Furthermore, the foreignness of the international terrorist was supplemented with a 
focus on the nomadic nature of terrorist groups. In 1993, law enforcement agencies in 
the United States were chasing Mohamed A. Salameh, a Jordanian fugitive who was 
wanted in connection with the World Trade Center bombings. In response to the fact 
that Mr. Salameh was constantly on the move, one official stated: “one search is 
leading to another… but these are nomadic people. While it may lie in the culture, 
they bounce from place to place. All different people sleep there, stay a short time, 
then leave.”80 It is telling that the justification the investigator gave regarding Mr. 
Salameh’s constant movement was because he came from a nomadic culture where 
such behavior was typical. The depictions of terrorists as both foreign and nomadic 
serve to further emphasize their otherness and to also highlight the danger they pose to 
western society. The terrorist is seen as an infiltrator in society rather than a member 
of it. Terrorism becomes a disease in society and the only option is to violently purge 
it: 
Terrorism is the cancer of the modern world. No state is immune to it. It is a 
dynamic organism which attacks the healthy flesh of the surrounding society. 
It has the essential hallmark of malignant cancer; unless treated, and treated 
drastically, its growth is inexorable, until it poisons and engulfs the society on 
which it feeds and drags down to destruction. 
Furthermore, the reference to the nomadic nature of the terrorist raises very 
specific fears in the Western world. International law has, in fact, from its inception 
been wary of nomads- it has not known what to do about them. 81 Nomads did not 
respect borders and boundaries, which put them in a position outside the scope of 
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international law. In a statement in 1890, J.B. de Martens Ferrao posited that: “natural 
rights are born with man… but international rights cannot be recognized in those 
[savage] tribes, for want of the capacity for government… being nomads or nearly 
such, they have no international character.”82 This depiction of terrorists as barbarous, 
nomadic outlaws that exist outside the structure of the law is very similar to how 
colonial powers depicted resistance movements. Colonial powers used the 
‘uncivilized’ and ‘savage’ nature of these resistance movements as a justification for 
the use of harsh tactics in suppressing such movements and denying them any rights 
under humanitarian law. For example, in his book titled the Reformation of War, 
Colonel J. F. C. Fuller of the British Army states:  
In small wars against uncivilized nations, the form of warfare to be adopted 
must tone with the shade of culture existing in the land by which I mean that, 
against peoples possessing a low civilization, war must be more brutal in 
type.83 
 The ‘uncivilized’ nature of the adversary in this case is what justifies the 
circumvention of humanitarian law. The depiction of terrorists as savage outlaws is 
yet another articulation of this very same rhetoric.  The coming section will 
demonstrate how the justifications given to deny Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters 
prisoner of war status rely on the same arguments used by colonial powers to violently 
suppress resistance movements.  
Confronting the New Other, the War on Terror: 
On September 11th 2001, a group of terrorists hijacked American airliners and 
used them as missiles by crashing them into the twin towers of the World Trade 
Center in New York and the Pentagon. Some 3,000 persons died or were missing as a 
result of the most devastating terrorist episode in U.S. history.84 In an address before a 
joint session of Congress on the 20th of September 2001, President Bush labeled the 
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attacks of September 11th as “an act of war.”85 There was obviously only one response 
to this act of war. President Bush later outlined the goal of the new war that America 
would be engaging in by stating, “ our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does 
not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped and defeated.”86 This marked the beginning of a new form of 
engagement with the terrorist other. The attacks of the 11th of September 2001 ushered 
in a new era of engagement with the terrorist outlaw. Having committed an act of war, 
the terrorist outlaw would be confronted through war. According to President Bush, 
this war on terror would end with the total eradication of terrorist groups. From the 
moment it was declared, the war on terror stirred up a lot of controversy. By 
literalizing its “war” on terror, the Bush administration has broken down the 
distinction between what is permissible in times of peace and what can be condoned 
during war.87 The terrorist was not a simple criminal that could be dealt with through 
the domestic justice system of a state, but a warrior engaged in a war against the state. 
In times of war, law-enforcement rules are supplemented by a more permissive set of 
rules: namely, international humanitarian law, which governs conduct during armed 
conflict.88 However, applying the international law of armed conflict to the war on 
terror created a fair amount of controversy. This section will focus on the contentious 
debate that arose as a result of the war on terror, in particular, the rules relating to the 
legal status the treatment of terrorists detained during the war on terror. 
The Legal Status of Detainees: 
From the very start of the war on terror, the US government engaged in an 
internal legal discussion to address the various legal challenges presented by this war. 
Various memoranda and letters circulated between the White House, the Department 
of Justice, the Department of State and the Department of Defense. These documents 
shaped US policy with regards to the war on terror. One of the most important 
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documents of this exchange is the legal memorandum sent in January 2002 by the 
Department of Justice to the legal advisor to the President, Alberto R. Gonzales. The 
memorandum sought to answer the question of whether or not the Third Geneva 
Convention applied to the war with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The memorandum 
dealt with the status of Al Qaeda fighters and Taliban fighters as two separate issues. 
First, the memorandum found that Geneva III did not apply to the war with Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban. According to the memorandum, Article 2 of Geneva III, which 
outlined the scope of the treaty, did not apply to the war with Al Qaeda. Article 2 
states that “the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”89 The memorandum 
concluded that the war against Al Qaeda did not fall within the scope of Article 2 
because Al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to the Geneva conventions.The 
Memorandum goes on to discuss Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
which sets minimum standards that should be adhered to in conflicts that fall outside 
of the scope of Article 2. According to the memorandum, “common Article 3 
addresses only non-international conflicts that occur within the territory of a single 
state party, again like a civil war. This provision would not reach an armed conflict in 
which one of the parties operated from multiple bases in several different states.”90 
Therefore, Al Qaeda enjoyed no Geneva rights whatsoever, even those enshrined in 
Common Article 3. According to the memorandum, “ it appears that the drafters of the 
Conventions had in mind only two forms of armed conflict that were regarded as 
matters of general international concern at the time: armed conflict between Nation-
States (subject to article 2), and large-scale civil war within a Nation-State (subject to 
Article 3).”91  
The memorandum stated that Geneva III did not apply to the Taliban as well. 
The memorandum used various arguments in support of not extending Geneva III to 
 
89 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Article 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 
International Committee of The Red Cross. 
90 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR ALBERTO R. GONZALES COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, AND 




captured Taliban militants. The memorandum discussed various options including the 
President’s constitutional right to suspend the application of Geneva III to the conflict 
in Afghanistan. However, the memorandum later concluded that if the President 
declined from exercising his constitutional right to suspend the application of Geneva 
III to the conflict in Afghanistan, it could still be argued that the Taliban do not enjoy 
the legal status of prisoners of war. The first argument forwarded was that 
Afghanistan was a failed state and that the Taliban did not exercise effective control 
over the territory of Afghanistan. Basically, the Taliban could not be considered the 
legitimate government of Afghanistan. The collapse of functioning political 
institutions in Afghanistan is a valid justification for the exercise of the President’s 
authority to suspend our treaty obligations towards that country.” 92The terrorist 
respects no law- not the criminal law, not moral law, not the law of peace, and not the 
law of war.93 The first justification for the declaration of Afghanistan as a failed state 
was that it did not exercise effective control over its territory. It is unclear whether the 
Taliban militia ever fully controlled most of the territory of Afghanistan.94 The 
memorandum went on to quote an expert opinion addressing the issue of Afghanistan 
being a failed state. According to this opinion, Afghanistan had: 
Ceased to exist as a viable state… the entire Afghan population had been 
displaced, not once but many times over. The physical destruction of Kabul 
has turned it into the Dresden of the late twentieth century… There is no 
semblance of an infrastructure that can sustain society – even at the lowest 
common denominator of poverty… The economy is a black hole that is 
sucking in its neighbors with illicit trade and the smuggling of drugs and 
weapons, undermining them in the process… complex relationships of power 
and authority built up over the centuries have broken down completely. No 
single group or leader has the legitimacy to reunite the country. Rather than a 
national identity or kinship-tribal-based identities, territorial regional identities 
have become paramount.. [T]he Taliban refuse to define the Afghan state they 
want to constitute and rule over, largely because they have no idea what they 
want. The lack of a central authority, state organizations, a methodology for 
command and control and mechanisms which can reflect some level of popular 
participation… make it impossible for many Afghans to accept the Taliban or 
for the outside world to recognize a Taliban government… no warlord faction 
has ever felt itself responsible for the civilian population, but the Taliban are 
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incapable of carrying out even the minimum of developmental work because 
they believe that Islam will take care of everyone.95 
Therefore, the Taliban seemed unable to carry out the basic internal functions 
of a government. The report also added that the Taliban were unable to engage in 
foreign relations. Publicly known facts suggest that the Taliban were unable to obey 
their international legal obligations.96  The final point made by the memorandum 
pertained to the issue of recognition. The Taliban militia was not recognized as the 
legitimate government of Afghanistan by the United States or by any member of the 
international community except Pakistan.97 The memorandum also suggests that even 
if Afghanistan were to be considered a functioning state, the Taliban would still not fit 
within the bounds of Article 4 of Geneva III. The arguments relating to Article 4 are 
outlined in a second memorandum sent by Jose Gonzales to the President on February 
7, 2002. In this memorandum Mr. Gonzales argues that “the Taliban have described 
themselves as a militia rather than the armed forces of Afghanistan;”98 therefore, the 
provisions of Article 4 that related to militias would apply in this case. Mr. Gonzales 
then concludes that even if these provisions were to be taken into consideration, the 
Taliban would not enjoy prisoner of war status. First, there is no organized command 
structure whereby members of the Taliban militia report to a military commander who 
takes responsibility for the actions of his subordinates.”99 Furthermore, Mr. Gonzales 
reiterated that “there is no indication that the Taliban militia wore any distinctive 
uniform or any other insignia that served as a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance.”100 The interesting part of Mr. Gonzales’s memorandum is that when it came 
to the requirement of carrying arms openly, he stated that the Taliban failed to meet it 
not because they didn’t carry arms openly. Mr. Gonzales stated, “this fact, however, is 
of little significance because many people in Afghanistan carry arms openly.”101 
According to Mr. Gonzales’ logic, the Taliban carrying arms openly would not 
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distinguish them from the civilian population since everybody in Afghanistan carries 
arms openly.  The final point Mr. Gonzales seems to be making is based on the 
concept of reciprocity. There is no indication that the Taliban militia understood, 
considered themselves bound by, or indeed were even aware of, the Geneva 
Conventions or any other body of law.102 In essence, Mr. Gonzales seemed to be using 
the fact that the Taliban acted in a manner inconsistent with the law as a justification 
for why the law should not apply to them.  
On February 7 2002, President Bush sent a memo to the various departments 
of the US governments outlining the decisions he had made with regards to the 
treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. In this memorandum, President Bush 
stated, “based on the facts supplied by the Department of Defense and the 
recommendation of the Department of Justice, I determine that the Taliban detainees 
are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under 
Article 4 of Geneva. I note that Geneva does not apply to our conflict with al Qaeda; 
al Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war.”103  
This position received a fair amount of criticism from various legal scholars and even 
from international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross. Once criticism of the US approach to the Taliban was that it relied on a narrow 
interpretation of Article 4 of the 3rd Geneva Convention. According to Article 4:  
 
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons 
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the 
power of the enemy: 
 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as 
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Are the Taliban soldiers not members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict? 
Or, at least, are they not members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of those 
armed forces?105 International Organisations such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross insisted that the doubt over the status of prisoners of war be resolved 
pursuant to the 3rd Geneva Convention. The ICRC stated that it ‘stands by its position 
that people in a situation of international conflict are considered to be prisoners of war 
unless a competent tribunal decides otherwise.106 This is a reference to Article 5 of the 
Convention, which states:  
 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent 
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the 
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of 
the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal.107 
 
The United States failed to adhere to provisions of Article 5. Despite claiming to fully 
support the Geneva Conventions, the US Government has refused to grant prisoner of 
war status to any of the people in its custody in Afghanistan or Guantánamo Bay, or 
submit the question of each person’s status to a competent tribunal to resolve the 
doubts about their status that plainly exist.108 Furthermore, the United States was 
criticized for treating Al Qaeda detainees in a cruel and inhumane manner. The most 
prominent instance of the abuse of prisoners in US custody was the 2004 Abu Ghraib 
scandal. Leaked pictures showed US soldiers abusing detainees, “forcing Iraqis to 
conduct simulated sexual acts, among other things, in order to break down their will 
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before they were turned over to others for interrogation.”109 Abu Ghraib was an 
example of what seemed to be a policy of abuse that was sanctioned by the Bush 
administration. For several years we have known that former Secretary of Defence, 
Donald Rumsfeld, was directly involved with torture, that he set down techniques, 
including chaining to the floor, stripping, hooding, and the use of dogs at Guantanamo 
and Abu Ghraib.110 US courts also weighed in on the debate on the treatment of 
detainees apprehended as part of the war on terror. An example of this is the Supreme 
Court ruling in Hamdan V. Rumsfeld. Mr. Hamdan was accused of being a member of 
Al Qaeda and tried begore a military commission that was established by a 
presidential order. Hamdan challenged that decision before the Supreme Court of the 
United States. One of Hamdan’s main challenges against his trial before a military 
commission was that the procedures that the President has adopted to try him violate 
the most basic tenets of military and international law, including the principle that a 
defendant must be permitted to se e and hear the evidence against him.111 The court 
agreed with Hamdan stating that Common Article 3 “ requires that Hamdan be tried 
by a “regulary” constituted court. 112 
 
 
The controversial debate that started as a result of the war on terror is yet 
another reflection of the dialectic of the self and the other. The war on terror, like the 
1974 conference, represents a form of engagement with the other. However, unlike the 
Diplomatic Conferences, the legal debate surrounding the war on terror did not 
attempt to include the other. The terrorist is portrayed as representing an 
unprecedented challenge to the law. This challenge does not simply lie in the novelty 
of the challenge created by international terrorism, but also in how the international  
terrorist engages with the law. It is constantly emphasized that the terrorist does not 
respect the law. These two elements were used by members of the Bush 
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Administration to justify non-applicability of the laws of war to the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda. The Bush Administration officials claimed that, since the laws of war did not 
account for international terrorism and the terrorists themselves seemed to flout the 
law, then the law should not apply to them. The Bush Administration’s distinction 
between Al Qaeda and the Taliban is quite telling. The Bush Administration uses 
many of the features outlined previously to describe Al Qaeda’s peculiarity. For 
example, the memorandum drafted by the Justice Department stated that Article 3 
could not apply to Al Qaeda because they operated in several states. In essence, the 
fact that Al Qaeda operates across borders, much like nomadic tribes, is one of the 
reasons why the law cannot apply to them. Al Qaeda is immediately dismissed as 
being outside the bounds of the law. The paradoxical result is that terrorists are 
charged with being violators of the laws of war and, yet, are treated as being outside 
of the scope of the law of war since they can never be recognized as legitimate 
combatants.113 Therefore, despite the fact that Al Qaeda is portrayed as a savage, 
irrational and violent other that exists outside the bounds of the law, this other is still 
held accountable for violating the law. Therefore, even through their exclusion from 
the law, the terrorist other is still somehow incorporated within it. 
The Taliban issue feeds into one of the main arguments being forwarded in 
this paper. Since war is the exclusive realm of the sovereign, and Afghanistan was a 
sovereign state that was governed by the Taliban, then surely the forces of the Taliban 
would be considered the armed forces of the state. The Bush Administration did not 
consider that to be true. They argued that since the Taliban did not act like a 
sovereign, then it couldn’t be considered as such. In essence, the Taliban acted more 
like terrorist bands and therefore forfeited their status as sovereign rulers. They were 
instead associated with the terrorists of Al Qaeda and seen as sharing their status as 
unlawful combatants. The Taliban did not exercise effective control over the territory 
of Afghanistan and were not able to provide basic services to the population. As a 
result, they could not be considered as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. 
Even when the Bush Administration caved to criticism relating to their refusal to 
apply Geneva III to the Taliban, they still didn’t afford the Taliban full coverage of the 
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Convention. The Taliban were still seen as unlawful combatants, much like their Al 
Qaeda allies.  
In conclusion, the international terrorist represents yet another category of 
humanitarian law’s other. However, unlike what happened with the national liberation 
movements that attended the Geneva Conferences, the law is uninterested in engaging 
with this other. The international terrorist is portrayed as the antithesis of everything 
the law represents. However, this other is still included within the law. Despite the 
fact that the terrorist is portrayed as an outlaw that operates outside the scope of the 
law and despite the fact that many claim that the law is not equipped to deal with this 
new phenomenon, the terrorist is still included in the law by being held accountable 
for violating it. The main structure of the law is upheld, war still remains the exclusive 
realm of the sovereign where non-state actors are punished for their involvement in 
hostilities. Even in the case of the Taliban, the fact that they did not act like a 
sovereign and that they were affiliated with a terrorist organization, made them forfeit 
their status as lawful combatants. Therefore, the war on terror demonstrates a different 
method of engaging with the other. However, even in this approach of exclusion, the 


















Since it’s inception, humanitarian law has been engaged in a dialectical 
process with its other, the non-state affiliated combatant. From indigenous resistance 
groups in the colonial era to modern day international terrorists, this other has 
manifested in different forms throughout history. The two historical moments outlined 
previously represent two different methods in which the law engaged with the other. 
However, the pattern remains clear,, the law is in a constant process of exclusion of its 
other.  Whenever, law attempts to engage the other, a new other is created to 
challenge the legal structure once more. So in Geneva in 1974, the law chose to 
engage with national liberation movements, to include them in the law-making 
process. However, this engagement created a new category of the other, the 
international terrorist. The international terrorist presented a new challenge to the law. 
The international terrorist could not be reconciled with the law. However, even when 
the law spoke of the other instead of speaking to them, this other was somehow 
included. That even through exclusion from the law, the terrorist was still a part of it, 
informing its movement and evolution without actually being an active member in the 
process. Both instances demonstrate that the law constantly creates and excludes its 
other. This perpetual spiral of engagement between self and other is the dynamic that 
this paper has sought to uncover. This perpetual dialectical process will always exist 
as long as the current structure of the law remains in place. The reason that the laws 
on lawful combatants and prisoners of war cannot be expanded to include non-state 
actors lies in the conceptual grounding of the principle of distinction. War is the 
domain of the sovereign and only the agents of the sovereign can wage war. The main 
purpose of the law becomes to uphold this worldview. This conceptual grounding is 
also what informs the engagement of the law with the other. The law engages with 
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those who conform to its worldview and excludes those who do not. The national 
liberation movements wished to be emancipated through the law, which is why they 
could engage directly with the law. Whereas the international terrorist movements 
rejected the law, which is why they were excluded and branded as outlaws. This type 
of engagement between the law and its other is never ending and constantly creates 
new categories of others. In essence, if the law wanted to truly engage with the other, 
then it need only engage in a process of introspection. So long as the only legitimate 
combatant in the eyes of the law is the state actor, then nothing will change. The 
notion that law is the sole domain of sovereign states must be reconsidered. The law 
must let go of the mythical battlefields of 18th Century Europe where armed men in 
uniform faced each other on open plains - battlefields imagined by philosophers such 
as Rousseau and Hobbes. If we were to assume that these battlefields truly existed 
beyond the imagination of European political philosophers, it could be safely said that 
they do not exist today. The wars of the 21st Century demonstrate that war is no longer 
the exclusive domain of the state. If the law truly wishes to engage with its other, to 
include non-state actors into the corpus of humanitarian law, then it must come to 
terms with this critical fact. If the law fails to do so, then it risks rendering itself 
obsolete. For most of the wars that are being fought involve non-state actors, the law’s 
continued inability to adapt to this reality threatens the entire system of humanitarian 
law.  
